Board Monitoring in Emerging Market Makaryanawati(a), Sriyani Mentari(b) and Ridoni Fardeni Harahap(c*)
(a), (b), (c) Universitas Negeri Malang *ridoni.fardeni.fe[at]um.ac.id
Abstract
The role of monitoring Board of Commissioners is critical in the mechanism of internal corporate governance, especially within inclined family-owned shares of emerging markets. One of such monitoring activities is the supervision of financial statement presentation. The success in monitoring role may be presented by the low earnings management performed by company executives. It is suggested that, the more effective the monitoring role is, the better firm value will be. This study aims to determine the effect of monitoring role of Board of Commissioners on firm value, and to examine whether family control can moderate the effect of monitoring role on firm value. Our population consists of non-financial service companies listed on Indonesia Stock Exchange 2016-2018. We employed purposive sampling and conducted 356 observations. We tested the data using moderated regression analysis. The results show that monitoring role cannot affect firm value. Likewise, family control cannot moderate the influence of monitoring role on firm value. These two notions provide evidence that the role of monitoring cannot operate well within companies in emerging markets whose shareholders are dominated by family.
Keywords: monitoring, firm value, family ownership, emerging market
Topic: Economics, Finance, Banking, and Accounting
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